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NON-FIDUCIARY LIABILITY UNDER
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT
JONATHAN

I.

D. SCHWARTZ*

INTRODUCTION

There is approximately $1 trillion currently invested in
America's employee benefit plans, and a figure that may rise
to more than $4 trillion by the turn of the century.' Benefit
plans are a tempting target for legislators searching for a
quick fix for the federal deficit, for corporations searching for
cash, and for entrepreneurs searching for venture capital.2
Not surprisingly, such enormous sums of money have also attracted individuals who misappropriate benefit plan assets.'
As the Seventh Circuit lamented, there is "a pattern which
seems distressingly prevalent today: the savings of working
men and women are pilfered, embezzled, parlayed, mismanaged and outright stolen by unscrupulous persons." 4 These
unscrupulous persons are benefit plan officials violating their
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 5 and non-fiduciaries who participate in
and profit from these breaches of fiduciary duties.
* B.S., 1983, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1986, Stanford Law School. The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the following persons: Barbara Babcock, Keith Hansen and Robert Weisberg.
1. See FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS - 1985 THIRD QUARTER
LEVELS 553; see also N.Y. Times, July 27, 1985, § 1, at 46, col. 5.
2. See N.Y. Times, July 15, 1984, at C4, col. 3.
3. See generally PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HOTEL EMPLOYEES & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, S. REP. No. 595, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter
cited as HEREIU REPORT]. For a discussion of the findings of the HEREIU REPORT,

see infra note 104.
4. Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982).
5. ERISA was enacted in 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1461 (1982 & Supp. 1983)). More recent amendments can be found at
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 (West 1985). ERISA covers both pension plans and welfare plans.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-1002(2) (1982). Pension plans provide for retirement income,
and welfare plans provide for benefits such as health care, dental care, disability and
accident benefits. See B. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (1985). For the purposes of this article, "benefit plan" refers to either type
of plan.
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ERISA is a "comprehensive remedial statute designed to

'protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit

plans and their beneficiaries.' ",6 ERISA protects these interests by imposing fiduciary obligations on benefit plan trustees
and other officials who exercise discretionary authority or
control over the management of benefit plans or the disposition of their assets.7 Fiduciaries are required to act solely in
the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries with the
skill, care and diligence that a prudent person acting in a like
capacity would exercise.' While the text of ERISA and its
voluminous legislative history are replete with references to
fiduciary obligations, there is no mention of obligations for
6. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978) (quoting 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1001(b) (West 1985)). See also Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d
911, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Assoc.
Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D. Hawaii 1980).
7. ERISA sets forth the definition of a fiduciary. It states, in pertinent part:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of its assets, (ii) he rendered investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982).
A benefit plan's governing documents will name certain individuals as "trustees."
In nearly all cases, plan trustees will qualify as fiduciaries under ERISA. For this reason, the word "trustee" and the word "fiduciary" are often used interchangeably, as are
the phrases "breach of trust" and "breach of fiduciary duties." It should be emphasized, however, that persons who are not trustees may be fiduciaries under ERISA. See
29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A) (1982). Determining who is a fiduciary is an important issue
under ERISA, but is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.
FED. 186 (1984).
8. The fundamental obligations imposed on fiduciaries are provided by ERISA. It
states, in pertinent part:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter or
subchapter III of this chapter.
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non-fiduciaries. 9 Nevertheless, every court I0 that has considered the question has concluded that non-fiduciaries can be
held liable under ERISA for their involvement in breaches of
fiduciary duties. 1
The enforcement powers granted by ERISA have not been
limited to actions against fiduciaries since it would be inconsistent with Congress" stated intention "to provide both the
Secretary [of Labor] and participants and beneficiaries with
broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]." 12 As one court stated: "[N]o sound reason appears
why ERISA should be emasculated by a construction which
precludes civil actions against non-fiduciaries."13 This view
takes on added force when one recognizes that from the perspective of plan participants and beneficiaries, it matters little
after a breach of fiduciary dufrom whom restitution is1 made
4

ties has been committed.

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982). Additional limitations on fiduciaries can be found at 29
U.S.C.A. § 1106(b) (West 1985). See also Little & Thrailkill,FiduciariesUnderERISA:
A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1977).
9. "Non-fiduciary" is not defined in ERISA. For the purposes of this article, "nonfiduciary" refers to a person, partnership, or corporation without fiduciary obligations
under ERISA.
10. See, e.g., Fink v. National Say. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S.
951 (1980); Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Nev. 1984); Donovan v.
Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390
(S.D. Ala. 1982); Donovan v. Unicorn Group, 3 EMPL. BEN. CAS. (P-H) 1665
1982); Freund v.
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); McDougall v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ill.
Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
11. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (West 1985). Section 1132(a) provides that the Secretary of Labor, participants and beneficiaries may bring civil actions "to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or... to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of
this subchapter." Id. (emphasis added). Section 502(a) is the numbered section within
ERISA corresponding to section 1132(a) in the official code.). Like other remedial legislation, ERISA has been given a broad construction in order to effectuate its goals.
See, eg., Kuntz v. Reese, 760 F.2d 926, 932 (9th Cir. 1985); Authier v. Ginsberg, 757
F.2d 796, 799-800 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 208 (1985); Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935
(1979); Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 349 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
12. S.REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4639, 4838, 4871. Throughout this article the word "Secretary" refers to
the Secretary of Labor.
13. Unicorn Group, 3 EMPL. BEN. CAS. (P-H) at 1667.
14. See McDougall, 539 F. Supp. at 598 n.5. The McDougall court held that ERISA empowered it to seek relief from a non-fiduciary "party in interest" who participated in a breach of fiduciary duties. Id. at 598-99. "Parties in interest" include, for
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Once a court decides that ERISA's reach is broad enough
to encompass non-fiduciaries, the more difficult task becomes
articulating a theory of liability given Congress' lack of guidance. So far, courts have relied either on a theory of "knowing participation" in a fiduciary's breach or on a conspiracy
rationale. Regardless of their approach, however, the analyses
are so cursory that it is difficult to discern the elements of
these theories of liability, let alone their applicability to other
factual situations.
This article first analyzes these theories of non-fiduciary
liability in order to determine their relative efficacy in addressing issues implicated by breaches of fiduciary duties. This article contends that the "knowing participation" rationale is
superior to the conspiracy approach. But in applying this
common law theory, courts should bear in mind the problems
that are peculiar to modern benefit plans and the broad powers they have been given by Congress to handle them. This
article will then explore the special issues raised by prepaid
benefit plans, one type of employee benefit plan that has acted
as a magnet for organized crime.15 This article concludes by
suggesting legislative changes that not only will make prepaid
benefit plans less attractive to organized crime, but also will
help eliminate other forms of non-fiduciary involvement in
breaches of fiduciary duties.
II.

KNOWING PARTICIPATION AND THE COMMON LAW

OF TRUSTS

In several ERISA cases, courts have relied on the wellestablished common law trust principle that liability may be
imposed on persons who knowingly participate in a breach of
trust. 16 This rule is set forth in Professor Bogert's treatise,
Trusts and Trustees:
example, fiduciaries, persons providing services to the plan, employers, employee organizations, and the relatives, officers, employees and beneficial owners of such individuals
or entities. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982). The court noted that non-fiduciaries who are
not parties in interest could also be held liable under ERISA. This article does not
differentiate between those who are parties in interest and those who are not.
15. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
16. Congress intended courts to look to common law trust principles when deciding issues involving breaches of fiduciary duties. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 13, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4649, 4651; S. REP.
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Just as every owner of a legal interest has the right that
others shall not, without lawful excuse, interfere with his
possession or enjoyment of the property or adversely affect
its value, so the beneficiary, as equitable owner of the trust
not knowingly join
res has the right that third persons shall
17
with the trustee in a breach of trust.

The Supreme Court stated this more succinctly in Smith v.
Ayer: "[T]he law exacts the most perfect good faith from all
parties dealing with a trustee respecting trust property...
The doctrine pervades the whole law of trusts."' 18 This section
examines the common law roots of this theory and suggests
how it can be adapted so it retains its vitality when used by
courts in ERISA actions.
A.

Knowledge

Should courts applying the "knowing participation" rationale in ERISA actions require that a non-fiduciary have actual knowledge of a breach of trust, or should constructive
knowledge suffice? The participants and beneficiaries would
be afforded a greater degree of protection if courts required
only a showing of constructive knowledge. On the other
hand, since ERISA does not explicitly impose any requirements on non-fiduciaries, it is arguable that liability should be
imposed only when actual knowledge of the breach can be
shown. This would be, in effect, a consolation prize for nonfiduciaries who believe that courts have no jurisdiction over
them in the first place.
In Ayer, a trustee breached his fiduciary duties when he
pledged notes belonging to the trust as collateral for loans to a
company in which he was an owner.1 9 In deciding whether
No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NES
4639, 4838, 4865; see also Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533
(1984); Marshall v. Teamsters Local 1282 Pension Trust, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
17. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEES § 901 (2d ed. 1982), quoted in Freund v.
Marshall & Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 642 (W.D. Wis. 1979). See also Lawrence
Warehouse Co. v. Twohig, 224 F.2d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1955); Sexton v. Sword S.S.
Line, Inc., 118 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 291, 295, 326 (1959).
18. Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 327 (1879).
19. Id. at 323-25.
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relief could be sought from the lenders, the Court emphasized
that the plaintiffs would only have to establish that the lenders
had constructive knowledge of the breach: "[H]owever free
from intentional wrong, [the lenders] must bear the responsibility of a mistaken judgment."20 The Court found that the
lenders were "acquainted ... with such matters as upon inquiry would have given them information" about the breach.21
The Court's willingness to hold the lenders liable to the trust
without a showing of actual knowledge is the accepted common law rule, and was followed in Freundv. Marshall & Ilsey
Bank,22 the first case holding non-fiduciaries liable under
ERISA.
In Freund,the trustees of a benefit plan and their relatives
were the controlling shareholders of several interrelated companies whose employees were covered by the plan. The court
found that the trustees violated their fiduciary duties under
ERISA by making unsecured loans of almost all of the plan's
assets to the companies sponsoring the plan.23 The trustees
also breached their fiduciary duties by not providing for the
plan's management after they and their relatives sold the companies to a buyer who subsequently bankrupted the consolidated entity.24
As for the relatives, who were non-fiduciaries under ERISA, the court recognized that under the common law of
trusts, "non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate, either directly or through an agent, in a breach of trust ... could be
held liable in an action brought by the beneficiary. ' 2 The
court stated that this theory of liability has two elements: "(1)
an act or omission which furthers or completes the breach of
trust by the trustee; and (2) knowledge that the transaction
amounted to a breach of trust, or the legal equivalent of such
'26
knowledge."
In Freund,the second factor was satisfied because "the uncontradicted evidence establishe[d] that the sellers were made
20. Id. at 325, quoted in Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. at 1396.

21. 101 U.S. at 326.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

485 F. Supp. at 642.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 642.
Id. (quoting G. BOGERT, supra note 17, at § 901).
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aware, prior to the consummation of the sale, not only [of]
facts from which the impending harm to the Plan ought to
have been clear, but also of the actually foreseen harm to the
Plan." 7 Even though the court found that the relatives possessed actual knowledge of the breach of trust, the court's
two-part test makes clear that it would have held them liable
solely on a showing of constructive knowledge.
Constructive knowledge was affirmatively recognized as a
basis for liability in Donovan v. Schmoute, 28 a case involving
the Southern Nevada Culinary and Bartenders Pension Trust,
casinos, hotels, and related companies with overlapping ownership and management. The Secretary of Labor alleged that
the plan's trustees violated their fiduciary duties by making
imprudent loans to companies controlled by Morris
Shenker, 29 who allegedly acted as a middleman between organized crime and the plan.3 ° Shenker and his companies
were non-fiduciaries under ERISA.3 1
Prior to trial, the Secretary settled with all but one of the
trustees. 32 A trial was held on the Secretary's claims against
the remaining trustee and against Shenker and the companies
he controlled for "knowingly participat[ing] in these breaches
of fiduciary obligations of the defendant trustees." 33After finding that the trustees had violated their fiduciary duties under
ERISA for the reasons stated above, the court held that
Shenker and his companies either had actual or constructive
knowledge of the fiduciaries' breaches of trust since they knew
of the plan's precarious financial condition, they knew of their
own precarious financial conditions, they knew the loan proceeds were being misapplied, they knew they had made misrepresentations to the plan, and they knew the collateral
securing the loans was insufficient.34
27. 485 F. Supp. at 642.
28. 592 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-74 (D. Nev. 1984).
29. Id. at 1368. Since the loans were very large, the Secretary also alleged that the
trustees violated their fiduciary duties by failing to diversify the investments of the plan.
Id.
30. See HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-27, 70-72.
31. See Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
32. Id. at 1368-69.
33. Id. at 1368.
34. Id. at 1398-99.
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Despite its awkward holding that the non-fiduciaries had
actual or constructive knowledge, the court emphasized that
constructive knowledge would suffice. Unlike the court in
Freund, however, which found support for its use of a constructive knowledge standard in the common law, the
Schmoutey court's justification for its use is mystifying. The
court cites Section 406 of ERISA, which states that a fiduciary shall not cause a plan to engage in transactions which "he
knows or should know" amounts to a "prohibited transaction" under that section.36 Even though "know or should
know" language is commonly associated with a constructive
knowledge standard, the court does not explain why a standard applied to fiduciariesshould also be applied to non-fiduciaries. The court noted that constructive knowledge is the
rule at common law, but inexplicably remarked that its conclusion "that these defendants were knowing participants in
the fiduciary breaches of the trustees ...does not rely to any
'37
extent on the foregoing trust principles.

While the courts in Freund and Schmoutey offer no coherent reasons why a constructive knowledge test is appropriate
in ERISA cases, they did reach the best result. It is always
difficult to establish actual knowledge, and this will be particularly true when benefit plans are involved. The large
amounts of money in these plans will often attract sophisticated and well-organized individuals whose ability to cover
their tracks should not be underestimated. Plaintiffs will
rarely find evidence of admitted wrongdoing, nor should they
expect non-fiduciaries to acknowledge their transgressions
35. See id. at 1393, 1395, 1398-99.

36. Id. at 1393. Section 406(a) prohibits a fiduciary from causing a benefit plan to
enter into five types of "prohibited transactions" with a "party in interest", see supra
note 14, unless an exemption is procured from the Secretary. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)
(1985). Since Shenker and several of his companies were "parties in interest,"
Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. at 1390-91, the Secretary also alleged that this section of ERISA was violated. The court, however, did not distinguish between non-fiduciaries who
were "parties in interest" and those who were not when it held all of them liable for
participating in the breaches of fiduciary duties.
The court also cited M & R Inv. Co., Inc. v. Fitzsimmons, 484 F. Supp. 1041, 1057
(D. Nev. 1980), aff'd, 685 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1982), which only adds to the confusion
since the court in that case pointed out that an analagous provision to Section 406
which appears in the Internal Revenue Code does not contain a knowledge requirement.
Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4975 (1980 & Supp. 1985)).
37. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. at 1396.
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during the discovery process or in a court of law. 38 At most,
intelligent non-fiduciaries, or non-fiduciaries with intelligent
counsel, will admit that they were aware of the fiduciary's actions, but were unaware that these actions amounted to
breaches of fiduciary duties under such a "complicated"
statute.
Regardless of the standard of knowledge applied, complications will arise when the non-fiduciaries are corporations.
Corporations will often be used to give an impression of legiti39
macy, to conceal identities, to hide assets, and to elude taxes.
In Schmoutey, for example, all but one of the non-fiduciaries
were corporations. While it is difficult to think that legal entities have any type of knowledge, courts in ERISA actions
should follow the general rule that "the knowledge of a director, officer, sole shareholder or controlling person of a corporation is imputable to that corporation."'' 4 Some courts in
non-ERISA cases have not imputed knowledge to a corporation unless the officer or director possessed "substantial" corporate responsibilities. 41 This amorphous standard should be
avoided in ERISA actions since legal wrangling over the definition of "substantial" will permit some non-fiduciaries to
hide successfully behind the corporate veil.
B. Participation
Once knowledge has been established, what constitutes
"participation" in a breach of trust? In Freund, for example,
the court found that the relatives of the trustees who were
personally involved in the relevant negotiations for the sale of
the companies, or were represented at the negotiations by
their agents, "participated" in the breach. 42 It would be impossible to list every conceivable way that a non-fiduciary
could participate in a breach of trust. This probably explains
38. See HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 141-43.
39. See generallyFraudandAbuse in Pensionsand RelatedEmployee Benefit Plans:
HearingsBefore the House Select Comm. on Aging, H.R. REP. No. 324, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMM. HEARINGS].

40. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. at 1399 (citations omitted).
41. See, eg., Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir.
1983).
42. Freund v. Marshall & Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 642 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
The court stated that the agent's "conduct and knowledge is to be attributed to their
principals." Id.
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why the court in Freund defined participation as broadly as
any "act
or omission that furthers or completes the breach of
43
trust.
The easiest case for finding participation is when the nonfiduciary personally interacts with a fiduciary who breaches
his position of trust. Some have argued that this should be a
prerequisite for non-fiduciary liability under ERISA because
the common law cases speak of knowing participation with a
trustee in a breach of trust. 44 Restrictive interpretations of
this type are precisely those that must be avoided in ERISA
actions. If non-fiduciaries know they can escape liability by
never directly dealing with perfidious fiduciaries, they will do
just that. They may still be active in the breach of fiduciary
duties, however, but only through their dealings with other
non-fiduciaries. Common sense suggests that non-fiduciaries
should not escape liability for having the good sense to use an
intermediary, nor should less cautious non-fiduciaries reap a
windfall when they have the good fortune never to meet a
fiduciary.
The more difficult case is when non-fiduciaries do nothing
more than receive plan assets with knowledge of its illicit
source. Is receiving tainted assets an act or omission that furthers or completes the breach of trust? Arguably, the nonfiduciaries have a duty to inform the plan's participants and
beneficiaries of the breach when they are offered the assets. If
they fail to notify them, one could say that there is an omission which furthers the breach. While this omission might
"be reprehensible under the highest standard of ethics, '4 5 no
such duty probably exists under American law. Moreover,
the imposition of a duty of notification could transform the
non-fiduciaries into de facto fiduciaries.46
While these "recipients with knowledge" may not have a
duty of notification, their actions make it more difficult to
43. Id. at 642 (quoting G. BOGERT, supra note 17, at § 901).
44. See, eg., Defendant's Notice of Motion to Dismiss at 7-8, 11, Brock v. Gerace,
No. 85-3669 (D.N.J. filed July 25, 1985).
45. G. BOGERT, supra note 17, at § 901.
46. See Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 641.
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trace plan assets once they have been misappropriated.47 In
this sense, receiving plan assets is an act which furthers the
breach, if not completes it. These recipients with knowledge
are culpable parties and should not be beyond the reach of the
courts. If the first recipient with knowledge passes the assets
on to another recipient with knowledge, and so on, the result
should be the same: they all should be held liable to the plan.
A more restrictive theory, under which liability is only imposed on persons who help cause a breach of trust, would result in inconsistent treatment. Non-fiduciaries who helped
cause a breach of trust would be held liable, while their transferees would not.
The common law has always looked disfavorably on recipients with knowledge. The general rule is as follows:
If the transferee has notice of the existence of a trust and of
the terms of the trust, and after using due diligence to ascertain whether the transfer is in breach of trust reasonably believes that the facts are such that the transfer is not in breach
of trust, he takes free of the trust . . .. If, however, the
[transferee] knows or should know that the trustee is abusing
his discretion and therefore is committing a breach of trust
* .. he takes subject to the trust.48
In Leake v. Watson,49 for example, investment brokers invested the assets of a trust that were improperly conveyed to
them by a trustee. The brokers, and their transferees who
took possession of the assets with knowledge of the trustee's
breach, were held liable to the trust: "So long as trust prop47. Trust assets may be commingled with other funds or converted into other assets. The problems with tracing and identifying trust assets are beyond the scope of this
article. See generally G. BOGERT, supra note 17, at §§ 866, 868, 901, 921-30.
48. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUsrs § 297 comment 1 (1959). See also
United States v. Dunn, 268 U.S. 121, 132 (1925) ("[T]he beneficiary of a trust may...
follow the trust res fraudulently diverted until it reaches the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.") (emphasis in original); In re Van Meter, 135 F. Supp. 781, 785-86
(W.D. Ark. 1955).
A non-fiduciary who receives plan assets but neither participates in nor has knowledge of a breach of trust should, in most cases, be permitted to retain the assets. An
exception should be made when the non-fiduciary is a donee who did not give any consideration for the assets. This will not leave the plan remediless, however, since plaintiffs can still pursue the fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries who participated in the breach.
49. 58 Conn. 332, 20 A. 343 (1890).
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erty improperly sold can be traced and identified, the50 holder
taking it with knowledge, it remains trust property."
Even if a court were convinced that common law principles require that non-fiduciaries must personally participate
with the trustee or help cause the breach of trust to occur in
order to be found liable, a court is free to ignore these principles in deciding who is liable under ERISA. The "knowing
participation" rationale is simply a starting point. Courts
have been given broad authority to decide questions of liability in the way they see best, and it should be exercised with
5
"the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans" '
borne in mind. Courts should not allow the formal requirements of any common law theory to place them in judicial
straitjackets, to the detriment of plan participants and
beneficiaries.
C. Remedies
Once liability is established, courts should fashion a remedy with two goals in mind. The benefit plan should be made
whole, and future transgressions should be deterred. At a
minimum, each fiduciary and non-fiduciary who receives plan
assets as the result of a breach of trust ought to be required to
restore to the plan all of their illicit profits.52 This is consistent with the common law rule that trustees and non-fiducia50. Id.
51. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5038, 5083. See, e.g., Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1143
(2d Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983).
52. This article focuses on monetary remedies. It should be emphasized, however,
that ERISA empowers courts to remove fiduciaries, issue injunctions, place plans in
receivership, and seek other appropriate equitable relief. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109 (West
1985). If non-fiduciaries are involved in breaches of fiduciary duties, courts should prohibit them from having any dealings with plan assets, trustees or other fiduciaries. The
court in Schmoutey, which permanently enjoined Shenker and his companies from using
or borrowing plan assets, is the only court to impose a non-monetary remedy on nonfiduciaries who were involved in breaches of fiduciary duties. Donovan v. Schmoutey,
1361 F. Supp. 1361, 1405 (D. Nev. 1984).
Short of placing plans in receivership, courts might appoint trustees to participate in
the management of a plan with the trustees already in place. The court-appointed trustees should have the same rights as ordinary trustees to gain access to plan documents
and files, to participate in discussions and meetings and to vote on plan business. While
it will be possible for the trustees already there to conceal matters from court-appointed
trustees and to outvote them, their presence should serve as a deterrent of some corrupt
activities. Other equitable remedies are beyond the scope of this article.
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ries should "disgorge their ill-gotten gains. '53 A problem
with this remedy is that some fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries
may be judgment-proof, outside of a court's jurisdiction or deceased, and therefore, some of the trust assets will not be recoverable. Moreover, even if everyone is able to restore to the
plan the assets they received, little deterrence will be achieved.
Defendants will face an attractive "heads I win, tails I break
even" situation.
Thus most courts applying the "knowing participation"
rationale in ERISA cases have imposed joint and several liability on both fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries. If one person
cannot restore what they took, then others are forced to shoulder an extra burden. There is an increased chance of making
the plan whole, and deterrence is greatly enhanced. But even
if joint and several liability is imposed, some parties will break
even. In order to insure that defendants will not be tempted
to flip the aforementioned coin again, courts should impose
additional penalties pursuant to their authority under Section
502(a) of ERISA.
Should exceptions be made for non-fiduciaries who do not
profit from their participation in a breach of trust? Although
these non-fiduciaries may be less culpable than those who
profit from the breach, their primary wrong is participation in
the breach. Non-fiduciaries may not have profited because of a
bad scheme or greedy accomplices. Some may have profited,
but will succeed in concealing their ill-gotten gains. Moreover, it would be ridiculous for non-fiduciaries who make no
profits to elude sanctions, while those who make a single dollar face joint and several liability.
Non-fiduciaries at common law faced joint and several liability regardless of whether profits were made. 4 In Duckett v.
National Mechanic's Bank of Baltimore,55 for example, a
53. Hunter v. Shell Oil, 198 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1952). See also Crites v. Prudential Ins. Co., 322 U.S. 408, 414 (1944) ("[T]he profits of others who knowingly

joined him in pursuing an illegal course of action ...would have to be disgorged and
applied to the estate.") (citations omitted).
54. G. BOGERT, supra note 17, at §§ 868, 901. See also Olin Cemetary Ass'n v.
Citizen's Say. Bank, 222 Iowa 1053, 1061-62, 270 N.W. 455, 459-60 (1937). Non-fiduciaries must also remit to the trust any profits made on the assets which were misappropriated. Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1921).
55. 86 Md. 400, 409-10, 38 A. 983, 986 (1897).
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trustee embezzled trust funds that were improperly credited to
his personal account by a bank that maintained his personal
account, but not the trust account. As to the relative culpability of the bank and trustee, the court stated:
There can be no doubt that as a general principle, all persons
who knowingly participate or aid in committing a breach of
trust are responsible for the money... they have been instrumental in diverting.... There is in such instances no
primary or secondary liability as respects the parties... participating 5in...
the breach of trust, because all are equally
6
amenable.
The court found that the bank "deliberately participated" in
the trustee's breach 57 and held it jointly and severally liable
with the trustee,
even though it reaped no gain from the
58
trust.
of
breach
While courts in ERISA actions must not hesitate in imposing joint and several liability on all non-fiduciaries who
participate in a breach of trust, they should be careful to insure that they are not holding some non-fiduciaries liable for
breaches of trust unrelated to those in which they
participated. 9
D.

Attorneys Representing Employee Benefit Plans: A
Special Class of Non-Fiduciaries

In Donovan v. Daugherty,6 ° the court held that the trustees
of a benefit plan violated ERISA by improperly extending
benefits to themselves and the plan's general counsel at a rate
56. Id. at 403, 38 A. at 984.
57. Id. at 410, 38 A. at 986.
58. Id. at 412, 38 A. at 987.
59. The court in Freund, for example, held all of the defendants jointly and severally liable for $465,000, the amount the companies owed to the plan. The problem is
that the court had not held the non-fiduciaries liable for participating in the improper
loans to the companies. Freund v. Marshall & Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 644 (W.D.
Wis. 1979).
The court may have thought that the breach of fiduciary duties that the non-fiduciary did in fact participate in, namely not providing for the plan's financial well-being
after sales of the companies, was inextricably related to the loans. Therefore, it may
have been too difficult to separate how much the plan lost on account of loans from how
much it lost as a result of the sale. This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that the
loans were made prior to the sale of the companies and may not have been paid off even
if the sales had not been consummated.
60. 550 F. Supp. 390 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
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more favorable than that given to the participants. 1 The
court also held that the general counsel, a non-fiduciary, participated in this breach of trust since he advised the fiduciaries
that the extension of coverage to them, and to himself, was
legal under ERISA.62 Even though the court stated that the
general counsel "knowingly participated" in the decision to
extend benefits, it did not say whether he had actual or constructive knowledge of the breach of trust. Did the court imply, therefore, that plan attorneys should be held liable
whenever their advice is incorrect and there is a breach of
trust?
If courts assume that plan attorneys have constructive
knowledge of a breach of trust whenever their advice is incorrect, the constructive knowledge standard would be nothing
more than a rule of strict liability. Few attorneys would welcome the opportunity to act as insurance policies for benefit
plans that are unable to recover from breaching fiduciaries.
The court in Daugherty would probably not have supported a
strict liability rule. It held at an earlier point in its opinion
that the general counsel should not be faulted for his incorrect
interpretation of an another provision of ERISA: "A lawyer
he is, but a sorcerer he is not. ' 63 Nevertheless, the court did
not reveal how it arrived at its conclusion that the general
counsel had knowledge of the breach.
Given that constructive knowledge should be established,
to what level of expertise should plan attorneys be held in deciding whether they "should have known" of a breach of fiduciary duties? Since benefit plans often engage in highly
complex transactions involving the earnings and savings of
thousands of workers, courts should hold plan attorneys to
the level of expertise exhibited by attorneys who are members
of the section of the bar that specializes in ERISA work. If
courts only require that plan attorneys exercise the legal and
financial skills of the average lawyer, or the average layperson
for that matter, benefit plans will not be adequately protected
from mismanagement and incompetence. A higher standard
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
1665, 1667

at 409.
at 411.
at 409. See also Donovan v. Unicorn Group, 3 EMPL.
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).

BEN. CAS.

(P-H)

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:561

of care would come as no surprise since lawyers are aware of
the traditional emphasis placed on protecting the interests of
trust beneficiaries.
Plan attorneys should face an additional responsibility not
placed on other non-fiduciaries. As discussed above, laypersons probably have no duty to report a breach of trust when
they have knowledge of its commission. But a different standard should apply when the non-fiduciary is an attorney representing a benefit plan. Even without participating in any
way in the breach of trust, if the attorney has knowledge of its
commission there is a duty, as a member of the bar, and more
important, as the paid representative of the participants and
beneficiaries, to report the breach to the Secretary, to the participants and to the beneficiaries. It is not enough that the
attorney keeps silent or withdraws as plan counsel.
III.

CONSPIRACY

A few courts have relied on a conspiracy theory of nonfiduciary liability in ERISA actions. Unfortunately, these
courts do not explain why they use it or how it would best
protect the interests of benefit plan participants and beneficiaries. The courts do not say whether the common law elements of a civil conspiracy must be proven in order to
establish liability, nor do they explain their oblique references
to the "knowing participation" theory of liability.
Thornton v. Evans,64 for example, involved the Teamsters'
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and
Welfare Fund, and individuals linked to organized crime.
Through a "complex web of dubious financial arrangements, ' 65 $1.1 million of life insurance premiums which the
plan paid to its insurer, Old Security Life Insurance Company
("Old Security") was illegally channelled through two companies to Joseph Hauser, the driving force behind the scheme.66
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court had improperly dismissed complaints that charged Hauser, his associates,
and lawyers representing the companies with conspiring with
a plan fiduciary to falsely represent that the money had been
64. 692 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1982).
65. Id. at 1066.
66. Id. at 1066-71.
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returned.67 After recognizing that Congress did not explicitly
address the issue of non-fiduciary liability, the court stated
that liability for persons "who conspire with fiduciaries... is
a necessary development of the law ERISA," and that it was
empowered to "develop '68
substantive legal principles that accommodate the statute.
Unfortunately, the court had little to say about the "substantive legal principles" it believed it was developing. 69 To
guide the district court to which the case was remanded, it
remarked with some circularity that non-fiduciaries have a
"duty ... to refrain from conspiracy to facilitate actions by
...fiduciaries constituting fraud on the [plan]." ' 70 To add to
the confusion, the court referred to "knowing participation"
'71
and the "relief available in traditional trust law."
The court's repeated use of the word "conspiracy" when
referring to non-fiduciary liability suggests that it did not use
the word carelessly. But this is difficult to say with certainty
since the court neglected to say anything about how to establish a conspiracy in the context of benefit plans. 2 This section
explores how the conspiracy doctrine might be used in ERISA
actions and concludes that it is ill-suited for such actions because it permits many culpable non-fiduciaries to avoid

liability.
67. Id. at 1083.
68. Id. at 1079 (citations omitted).
69. The court did, however, elaborate on the procedural requirements of a derivative suit against non-fiduciaries. Id. at 1077-83.
70. Id. at 1082 n.42.
71. Id. at 1078.
72. The Seventh Circuit had another opportunity to articulate the requirements of
its conspiracy theory of non-fiduciary liability in Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., 606
F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979), where former employees of the defendant-company sued to
recover benefits allegedly owed to them under the company's benefit plan. One plaintiff
had been a plan trustee, and the other had been a non-fiduciary employee of the company. Id. at 753-54. The company counterclaimed alleging that the plaintiffs should be
denied benefits because they had stolen property and trade secrets from the company.
Id. at 758. The court stated that "in an ordinary action against a trustee, others who
have aided him, or conspired with him, in a breach of fiduciary duty may... be [held]
liable." Id. at 759 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 256 (1959)). It held,
however, that this was not an ordinary action since the employee had "legislatively
granted rights" to receive his benefits. Fremont, 606 F.2d at 759. This probably explains why the court had nothing else to say about its conspiracy theory of liability.
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The Agreement and FiduciaryConspirators

The court in Thornton did require that plaintiffs prove one
thing at trial: "[a] necessary element of plaintiffs' claims
against the non-fiduciary defendants is that they conspired
with fiduciaries (who need not be defendants in this action),
and if this element is lacking, the court is without ERISA jurisdiction over these defendants. '7 3 At first glance, this appears to be consistent with the "knowing participation" cases,
where liability is predicated on involvement in a fiduciary's
breach of trust. However, when the elements of a conspiracy
are examined, it turns out that this requirement is inconsistent
with these cases and unnecessarily limits a court's ability to
seek relief from non-fiduciaries.
The elements of a civil conspiracy are "two or more persons, an object to be accomplished, a meeting of the minds on
the object of the course of action, one or more unlawful acts,
and damages proximately resulting therefrom." 74 A "meeting
of the minds" has been defined as "an agreement or understanding between two or more persons to inflict a wrong or
injury upon another."75 There is no requirement that the
agreement be manifested in words or in writing.76 Instead, it
is "sufficient that the minds of the parties meet understandingly" on the action to be taken. 77 Given such a broad interpretation, it will often be easy to establish that a fiduciary and
non-fiduciary had an agreement to commit a breach of trust.
On the other hand, there will be times when it will be impossible to say that there was any agreement at all, and under the
rule announced in Thornton, a court would not be able to seek
relief from the non-fiduciary.
For example, assume that an incompetent yet honest benefit plan fiduciary violated fiduciary duties under ERISA by
failing to check the financial background of a non-fiduciary
who borrowed money from the plan. Also, assume that the
73. 692 F.2d at 1078 n.34.
74. 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 1(2) (1967).
75. Reid v. Brechet, 117 Neb. 411, 415, 220 N.W. 590, 591, reh'g denied, 117 Neb.
418, 221 N.W. 17 (1928).
76. 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy§§ 2, 17 (1967). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 50
(1979).
77. 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy§§ 2, 17 (1967). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 50
(1979).
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non-fiduciary knew that the loan would not have been received if even the most cursory review of its financial history
had been undertaken. Under Thorton, the non-fiduciary
would escape liability since there would be no evidence of any
agreement between the fiduciary and the non-fiduciary.
The Seventh Circuit inadvertently stumbled upon a significant weakness with a conspiracy approach to ERISA non-fiduciary liability. There are two broad categories into which
all breaches of trust fall. In the first are breaches where the
fiduciary is corrupt and intentionally violates statutory duties.
In the other category, the fiduciary is incompetent or lazy and
is not aware of the statutory violation. If a non-fiduciary
knowingly participates in the first type of breach, an agreement will often, but not always, be found. But if a non-fiduciary participates in the latter type of breach, no agreement will
be found. This distinction may be important in conspiracy
actions, but is irrelevant under ERISA, where the emphasis is
on the breach of trust, not the agreement. In both categories
of cases, the non-fiduciary is involved in a breach of trust, and
would be held liable under the "knowing participation"
rationale.
It should be emphasized that an agreement will not always
be found whenever the fiduciary is corrupt. For example, a
corrupt fiduciary may breach fiduciary duties by secretly
transferring plan assets into a non-fiduciary's bank account.
The fiduciary may believe that the non-fiduciary is unaware of
the breach of trust, when in fact, the non-fiduciary is fully
cognizant of it. It would be difficult to argue that there was an
agreement between the two parties. Yet, the non-fiduciary in
this example is the "recipient with knowledge" encountered in
Section II, whose liability should not turn on whether or not
there was an agreement.78
A more interesting situation is when there is an agreement,
but no breach of fiduciary duties. Assume that in the first example, there was not one but two non-fiduciaries who received
a loan from the plan. Also assume that the fiduciary fulfilled
its obligations under ERISA by making an extensive check of
their financial backgrounds, but the non-fiduciaries falsified
their records in order to appear to be good lending risks.
78. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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While there was a meeting of the minds between the non-fiduciaries, there was none with the fiduciary. Since the non-fiduciaries are culpable parties, however, it would be tempting to
hold them liable under ERISA in order to protect the interests
of plan participants and beneficiaries.
The problem is that courts have no authority over nonfiduciaries independent of the authority granted to them in
Section 502(a) of ERISA, which only applies when there is a
violation of the statute. In the example directly above, there is
no violation of the statute by the fiduciary, or anyone else for
that matter. If the non-fiduciaries were held liable, there
would be no limit on the courts' ability to seek relief from
non-fiduciaries whenever a benefit plan had been wronged.
Section 502(a) is a vehicle through which courts can derive a
great deal of power when proceeding against non-fiduciaries,
but that power is nonexistent if there is no underlying fiduciary breach.
This view is consistent with the "knowing participation"
cases where, by definition, there must be participation in afiduciary's breach. Plaintiffs would not be remediless, however,
when there is no breach of trust. They could seek relief under
several common law theories, including fraud, theft, conversion, and of course, conspiracy. Unfortunately, these common law theories, and the statutes that codify them, may
present substantive and procedural obstacles that will be difficult to overcome. ERISA was designed in large part to overcome these obstacles, but only insofar as they relate to
fiduciaries.7 9 Given the considerable problems that courts
have had in interpreting fiduciary obligations under ERISA, it
is unlikely that Congress could take on the formidable task of
formulating independent duties for non-fiduciaries.
B.

The Agreement and the Knowledge Requirement

In a conspiratorial agreement, the parties involved must
have the "wrongful intent" to commit an unlawful act.80 In79. See, e.g., Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 1982);
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 653 F.2d 1208, 1214-15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 968 (1981).
80. 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy§§ 2, 17 (1967). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 50
(1979).

1986]

ERISA NON-FIDUCIARY LIABILITY

tent suggests actual knowledge, but actual knowledge of what?
If it refers to the breach of trust, courts that strictly apply a
conspiracy rationale in ERISA cases will deal many plaintiffs
a fatal blow. As discussed above, it will often be difficult to
prove that intelligent, well-organized non-fiduciaries had actual knowledge of a breach of trust.
Plaintiffs will be able to avoid this insuperable burden if
courts carefully apply the conspiracy doctrine. There can be a
civil conspiracy to commit almost any unlawful act.81 Some
unlawful acts, like breaches of trust, have a knowledge requirement, while other unlawful acts, like misbranding drugs,
are strict liability offenses. The knowledge requirement, if
any, of these unlawful acts does not change simply because it
is part of a conspiracy action. Conversely, the actual knowledge requirement in conspiracy cases applies to the agreement,
not to the unlawful act, which retains its own standards of
proof. The risk in ERISA actions is that courts applying the
conspiracy rationale will blur this distiction and apply an actual knowledge standard to both the agreement and the details
of an unlawful act.
In Blankenship v. Boyle, 82 a case decided prior to the enactment of ERISA, the court properly maintained this distinction. The trustees of a benefit plan violated their common law
fiduciary duties by permitting the plan's assets to remain
uninvested in non-interest bearing checking accounts of a
bank which was owned and controlled by a union whose
members were covered by the plan. 3 The plaintiffs alleged
that the union, the bank, and the bank's former president conspired with the trustees in their breach of fiduciary duties.
Before deciding that these non-fiduciaries could be held liable, the court stated: "[T]he civil wrong alleged to have been
done pursuant to the agreement... is a breach of trust; and it
is settled that where a third person 'has knowingly assisted the
trustee in committing a breach of trust, he is liable for participation in the breach of trust."' 84 The court later stated that
actual or constructive knowledge would satisfy the "know81.
82.
83.
84.

See 15A CJ.. Conspiracy § 20 (1967).
329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
Id. at 1095-99.
Id. at 1099 (quoting 4 Scorr ON TRUSTS § 326 (3d ed. 1967)).
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ingly assisted" standard. 5 Thus, after finding an "agreement," the court was willing to hold the non-fiduciaries liable
if they only had constructive knowledge of the who-what-andwhere of the breach. This may explain why the court in
Thornton quoted common law trust language after emphasizing that the plaintiffs would have to prove there was a
conspiracy.
C. Withdrawal and the Late Joiner
Conspiracy doctrine provides at least two ways to expand
the potential liability of non-fiduciaries after it has been shown
that they agreed to be involved in a breach of trust. There is
the presumption that a conspiracy continues once an agreement has been consummated, and to escape liability "a party
must affirmatively withdraw from the conspiracy and seek to
avoid its effects." '8 6 The withdrawal must be complete and
voluntary, and must bring "home the fact of [the] withdrawal
to [the] confederates. '8 7 The converse situation involves the
late joiner.8 1 Conspiracy doctrine states that "[p]ersons having knowledge of a conspiracy who enter into it after its inception... are liable for all acts previously.., done in pursuance
thereof."" 9 In other words, a person joining a conspiracy
"takes [it] as he finds it." 90
As tempting as the withdrawal and late joiner rules might
be, for their deterrent value if nothing else, they should not be
applied in ERISA actions if non-fiduciaries would be held liable for breaches of trust in which they did not participate.
The crux of a case brought against non-fiduciaries under ERISA is the breach of fiduciary duties; the existence of an agreement is irrelevant. If a non-fiduciary agrees to become
85. 329 F. Supp. at 1103 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 1101 (citing Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912); South-East
Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 784 (6th Cir. 1970), cerL denied,402
U.S. 983 (1971)).
87. Tabb v. Norred, 27 So. 2d 223, 229 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 279 So. 2d 694

(La. 1973).
88. Chemetron Co. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1180, rehg denied, 689
F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on othergrounds, 460 U.S. 1007, cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1013 (1983).
89. 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 19 (1967).
90. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 n.12 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968).
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involved in a breach of trust, but retreats from that position
before the breach occurs, the non-fiduciary is outside the purview of ERISA unless it can be shown that even before withdrawing, the non-fiduciary somehow facilitated the breach.
The same is true in the converse situation, where the breach
may occur before the non-fiduciary meets the parties involved,
or even knows which plan was bilked. This is not to say that
the non-fiduciary should escape all sanctions, but the sanctions should come from the law of conspiracy, where the
agreement is key. Even though a purpose of this article is to
encourage courts to look to common law principles which best
serve the participants and beneficiaries, it must be done with
the limitations of ERISA borne in mind.
D. Remedies
The parties to a common law conspiracy are usually held
jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from the
conspiracy, 91 the result reached in most "knowing participation" cases. In Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co.,92 however,
the court indicated that it might be appropriate to limit the
remedy "to the extent that [the non-fiduciary] profited from
the breach." 93 Similarly, the court in Donovan v. Bryans,94 another ERISA action, simply ordered the non-fiduciary to
"make restitution to the Plan for the benefit received." 95
Neither court offered any reasons why joint and several liability should not be imposed.
If courts hope to deter future involvement in breaches of
trust, and increase the likelihood that plans will be made
whole, restitution alone is a poor choice. In fact, the court in
Bryans indicated that it might settle for even less. It explained
that it was seeking restitution from the non-fiduciary since the
"fiduciary violations ...could not have occurred but for his
assistance. ' 96 This suggests that in future cases the court
91. See AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 56 (1979).
92. 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979); see supra note 72.
93. Id. at 759.
94. 566 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
95. Id. at 1267 (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 138(2), 150, 156
(1937)).
96. 566 F. Supp. at 1267. In Bryans, two trustees of a benefit plan violated their
fiduciary duties under ERISA by loaning plan assets to a non-fiduciary who was their
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might not seek relief from a non-fiduciary who was not the
"but for" cause of the breach. If this were the general rule,
some non-fiduciaries would escape liability.
For the reasons discussed in Section II, joint and several
liability should be imposed "whether or not the conspirator
profited from the result of the conspiracy," and "regardless of
whether [the conspirator] took a prominent or an inconspicuous part in the execution of the conspiracy. ' 97 For example in
Old Security Life Insurance Co. v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company,98 a non-ERISA case involving the same insurance scheme discussed in Thornton, the
Seventh Circuit held that Old Security conspired with Hauser,
and the other defendants in that case, to exploit an "inside
connection" that Hauser had with the plan's insurance advisor in order to secure the insurance contract. 99 Even though
Old Security did not make a single dollar from the scheme,
and did not know the identity of Hauser's "inside connection," it was held liable for the full $1.5 million the plan
lost. loo
While the court's holding is consistent with common law
conspiracy principles, the court relied on a trust principle instead: "[A] party receiv[ing] money as the result of ... [a]
breach of fiduciary duty . . . is imposed with the status of
business associate in another company. Id. at 1260-64. In deciding that the non-fiduciary could be held liable under ERISA, the court haphazardly combined conspiracy and
"knowing participation" language. The court stated that the non-fiduciary "actively
collaborated" with the fiduciaries in the breach of trust. Id. at 1267. While collaboration or collusion are words typically associated with a conspiracy, see 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 1(1), the court avoided any problems that the collaboration/conspiracy
approach might pose by stating in the next paragraph that the non-fiduciary "knowingly assisted [the fiduciaries] in violating their trust," and that "the path toward relief
is... guided by the law of trusts." Bryans, 566 F. Supp. at 1267.
The fiduciaries were held liable for the loan to the non-fiduciary. Id. at 1269. However, the court stated that to the extent the fiduciaries were "called upon to satisfy what
primarily is [the non-fiduciary's] obligation to the Plan, [the fiduciaries] will be subrogated to the rights of the Plan to proceed against [the non-fiduciaries]." Id. at 1267-68.
Since the trustees, and not the non-fiduciary, owed the "primary" obligation to the
Plan, this right of subrogation was undeserved.
97. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 56 (1979); see also Blankenship, 337 F. Supp. at
303 ("It is. . . [irrelevant] that the impact of any judgment may be far more severe on
an individual than it is on an entity such as the Bank or the Union.").
98. 740 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 1396-97.
100. Id. at 1390, 1397-98.
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trustee ex maleficio, and holds the property in constructive
trust for the benefit of the beneficiary." ' 1 Not only does the
court rely on a trust principle, but it relies on the wrong one
since Old Security did not have any plan assets on which to
impose a constructive trust.102
IV.

PREPAID BENEFIT

PLANS AND ORGANIZED CRIME

The cases above demonstrate that breaches of fiduciary
duties come in many guises, as do the non-fiduciaries who participate in their commission. Non-fiduciaries run the gamut
from local business people taking advantage of small benefit
plans in their community to professional criminals bilking the
benefit plans of the largest unions in the country. This section
examines whether the "knowing participation" rationale,
which provides a more coherent framework in which to decide
questions of non-fiduciary liability than conspiracy doctrine,
may be useful in reducing the abuses of prepaid benefit plans
by the latter group of non-fiduciaries. 03 While organized
crime's influence over unions and their benefit plans manifests
itself in diverse ways, some of which were seen in the
Schmoutey and Thornton cases, prepaid benefit plans are favorite targets.' °4
101. Id. at 1397.
102. Id. at 1390. The common law principles to which the court refers apply when
a person is in possession of trust assets. See United States v. Dunn, 268 U.S. 684, 691
(1889); 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 256 (1975).
103. See HEREIU REPORT, supranote 3, at 9 ("Prepaid [benefit] plans are a magnet for criminal schemes due to their methods of cash receipt and disbursement.").
104. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs (PSI) held hearings periodically from 1982 to 1984 in order to
determine the extent to which organized crime controlled the Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union (HEREIU). The PSI concurred with the conclusion reached by the Department of Justice in an unreleased 1977 report. "[HEREIU
is] completely dominated by men who either have strong ties or are members of the
organized crime syndicate.... [HEREIU] has been infiltrated from the top... [and]
represents the classic example of an organized crime take-over of a major union."
HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. The PSI determined that organized crime was
responsible for improper loans, increased salaries for HEREIU officials, lifetime employment contracts, increased expenditures for tangible and intangible items, manipulation of local chapters and abuse of prepaid benefit plans. See HEREIU REPORT, supra
note 3.
The PSI emphasized that it had no reason to believe that these problems were limited to HEREIU. As PSI Chairman William Roth lamented, "[The] three other large
international unions - the Teamsters, the Laborers, and the Longshoreman ... have
[also] been riddled with corruption and mismanagement at their highest levels." Hotel
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Magnets for Criminal Schemes

Prepaid benefit plans (PBPs), also known as closed panel
capitation plans, are fringe benefit programs agreed upon by
labor and management during collective bargaining. 10 5 PBPs
cover five types of benefits for eligible union members: dental,
hospital, medical, optical and pharmaceutical.10 6 An employer or employer group will pay a fixed amount into a trust
fund to cover the cost of the PBPs.107 The trust fund trustees
will hire a "trust administrator," a fiduciary under ERISA, 08
that will be responsible for organizing all of the PBPs.'0 9
Since this task is normally too large for one trust administrator, it will subcontract to "plan administrators" to organize
the individual PBP's. 110 The plan administrators will identify
"service providers," to whom the union members must go for
their medical care in order to be covered, and will manage the
PBP's day-to-day operations."'
If a PBP is legitimately run, the trustees will solicit bids
from potential trust administrators and make their selection
solely on the basis of cost, experience and quality of services.
The trust administrator selected will then solicit bids from poEmployees & Restaurant Employees International Union: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1982). The HEREIU materials cited in this section, which primarily
deal with prepaid dental plans, provide an excellent example of the types of problems
which are not limited to this type of organized crime activity or to this union.
105. HEREIU Hearings,98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 407 (1983) (statement of
Dennis Cook, Department of Labor).
106. Id. at 5. There has been increasing use of PBPs for legal assistance; indeed,
almost any service could be provided in the form of a PBP. Id. at 13.
107. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 103.
108. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(14)(A), 1002(16)(A) (West 1985).
109. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 103. Since administrators, service providers, and support suppliers are often corporations, each will be referred to as "it" rather
than "he" or "she."
110. HERElUHearings,98th Cong., 1st Sess.,pt. 4, at 7 (1983) (statement of Dennis Cook, Department of Labor). Arguably, plan administrators are also fiduciaries
under ERISA. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. For purposes of this article
however, it will be assumed that plan administrators are non-fiduciaries.
111. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 103. PBPs should be distinguished from
open panel plans which are typically associated with health insurance companies like
Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Under open plans, the employer or employer group will pay
the premiums, participants visit the service provider of their choice, and bills are paid
by the insurance company, subject to deductibles and exemptions. Id.
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tential plan administrators, 112 who in turn, will solicit bids
from potential service providers. 3 Unlike the trust and plan
administrators, whose fees will be a percentage of the total
employer contributions to the trust fund, 11 4 the service provider selected will receive a fixed per capita fee which is multiplied each month by the number of eligible union members.115
The service provider's profits, therefore, will depend upon the
number of 116
people that use its services and the type of work
performed.
Ideally, a competitive bidding process will produce a PBP
that provides quality care at the lowest possible price. Unfortunately, the entire process is often rigged to provide organized crime with the highest possible profits for the least
possible work. 1 7 It first exerts its influence when the trustees
contract with the trust administrator - the "critical step in a
fraudulent plan."11 Organized crime figures may serve as
trustees, but more often they will control those who do 1 9 by
resorting to unsavory tactics in order to dominate the selection process.1 20 As a result, there either is "non-competitive
bidding or competitive bidding which is inherently suspect,"12 1 and organized crime will have the trust administrator of its choice.
Since it controls the selection of the trust administrator,
organized crime will also control the selection of the plan administrator. The plan administrator will be required to kickback a large portion of its fees in return for being selected by
112. HEREIUHearings,98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 7 (1983) (statement of Den-

nis Cook).
113. See HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 103-07.

114. HERElUHearings,98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 7 (1983) (statement of Dennis Cook).
115. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 103 n.334.
116. Id. at 103-04. Ifa PBP is legitimately run, there usually will be a "maximum
cap" on the profits that service providers can make. Profits exceeding the "cap" have to
be returned to the trust fund. Id. at 104.
117. Id. at 105-07.
118. See HEREIUHearings,98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 8 (1983) (statement of
Dennis Cook).
119. See HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-20.
120. See HEREIUHearings,97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1982) (statement of
James Maher, Federal Bureau of Investigation) ("They will burn your business, blow up
your car, blow up your home, threaten your family. They will kill you, and that gives
them quite a competitive edge.").
121. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 105-07.
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the trust administrator. In order to insure that it can meet
this commitment, and still guarantee itself a healthy profit, it
will take as its fee an unusually high percentage of the total
employer contributions for the PBP. 122 The trust administrator will also change a high percentage, but as its reward for
"overseeing" the plan's PBPs in a way that allows organized
crime to reap its profits, it usually will not have to make any
kickbacks.12 3 Moreover, since trust administrators have fiduciary obligations, their actions will be subject to greater scrutiny than plan administrators.
In order to conceal its kickbacks to organized crime, the
plan administrator's payments will often be made through
"support suppliers," companies controlled by organized crime
which supposedly provide the plan administrator with secretarial services, computer assistance, office space and equipment,
marketing and consulting assistance, complaint resolution
services, etc. These companies are often nothing more than
conduits to organized crime, and provide little in the way of
24
actual services.1
The pilfering does not end there, however. The service
provider, who normally is not as closely associated with organized crime as the administrators, will find that in order to
secure the PBP contract it must hire certain support suppliers. 125 Not coincidentally, they are often the same ones that
work for the plan administrator. 26 The service provider is
willing to hire them when it discovers that this is the only way
it can be selected and that it will receive a high per capita fee
that more than compensates it for any unnecessary
27
expenses. 1
In PBPs that are legitimately run, the total administrative
costs, which include the adminstrators' fees and the amounts
paid to service providers and support suppliers, are limited to
122. HEREIU Hearings,98th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 8-10 (1983) (statement of
Dennis Cook).
123. See HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 107-08.
124. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 107-08. It should be emphasized that
even corrupt PBPs hire many legitimate support suppliers as well. See HEREIUHearings, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 7, 13 (1983) (statement of Dennis Cook).
125. See, e.g., HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 118-19.
126. See, e.g., id. at 112-21.
127. See, eg., id. at 119.
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ten to fifteen percent of the employer contributions. 128 The
administrative costs for corrupt PBPs are considerably higher.
For example, in one nine-month period, the administrative
costs for HEREIU Local 54's Dental Plan in Atlantic City,
New Jersey, were approximately forty percent of the $1.15
million contributed by the employers that period for the dental plan. 129
B.

Problems in EstablishingNon-FiduciaryLiability

The primary reason that no federal court has addressed
this problem is that corrupt schemes involving non-fiduciaries
are very complex, and therefore, difficult to identify. "You
need very special kinds of investigators for this kind of crime.
You need people who understand the actuarial tables, audit
procedures, [and] have [a] background in criminal law. The
average investigator is going to look at these records all day
long and not perceive what is going on." 130 This is not surprising given the considerable skills possessed by organized
crime figures, and the lawyers, accountants and other consul1 31
tants that they hire to assist them.
Organized crime figures will attempt to make their
schemes appear respectable, so as not to attract the attention
of state or federal authorities. One way to do this is to provide
union members with quality services. The problem is that the
union members are paying Rolls-Royce prices for Cadillac
services.132 Itwas stated above that kickbacks would be channelled through support suppliers to organized crime. The
money will usually take a more circuitous route, travelling
through several entities, and often ending up not in the hands
of organized crime figures, but in the hands of their relatives,
128. Id. at 104.
129. Id. at 112, 114, 120.
130. HEREIU Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 14 (1983) (Statement of
Senator Warren Rudman).
131. HEREIUHearings,98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 8 (1983) (statement of Dennis Cook) ('These people are extremely imaginative, innovative, intelligent; they hire
extremely qualified people in the field to use their brain[s] .... experience ...[and] ...
knowledge to find new and exciting ways to take money out of these plans.").
132. See HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 105-10; HEREIU Hearings, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 12 (1983) (statement of Dennis Cook). While management
actually pays for the PBP, if it is overpriced due to the influence of organized crime,
there is less money available for wages and other fringe benefit programs.
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friends or companies that they secretly control. In order to
legitimize the transfers from one entity to the next, the plan
assets may be called dividends, donations, or salaries, and at
the same time, they may be commingled
with other funds so
133
they become harder to trace.
While the most difficult problem is simply identifying
which PBPs have been corrupted, once this is accomplished, it
should be relatively easy to establish that the trustees and the
trust administrator failed to satisfy their fiduciary obligations
when they permitted enormous sums of money to be raked off
the top in the form of administrative costs. 134 If these fiduciaries breached their statutory duties, it should also be possible
to find the non-fiduciaries, namely the plan administrator, the
service provider and the support suppliers, liable under ERISA for their knowing participation in these breaches of trust.
The paper record will probably contain little more than a
few contracts, some facially innocuous communications, cancelled checks, and the service provider's files on the individual
union members. There will not be written evidence establishing actual knowledge of the breaches of trust, nor should one
expect organized crime figures to admit to any wrongdoing
during depositions or at trial, and many are apt to assert their
fifth amendment rights. Non-fiduciaries, such as service providers who are not members of criminal syndicates, will not be
likely to make any admissions either, since it usually is not in
one's best interests to "tattle" on organized crime. 135 As discussed above, however, courts should require only that plaintiffs establish that non-fiduciaries had constructive knowledge
of the breaches of fiduciary duties.
In most cases, there will be a marked difference between
the rates charged by corrupt non-fiduciaries, and those
charged by legitimate non-fiduciaries in the average PBP.
Courts should charge plan administrators with the knowledge
that the total administrative costs of the average PBPs is fifteen percent or less. If the plan administrator helped itself to
133. See, e.g., HEREIU Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 169-70 (1983)
(statement of Paul Jackson, Fellow, Society of Actuaries, The Wyatt Co.).
134. See supra note 8 for a discussion of fiduciary obligations.
135. See, e.g., HEREIU Hearings,97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1982) (statement of Chairman William Roth).
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twenty-five percent of the employer contributions, it "should
have known" (and probably did know) that there was a
breach of fiduciary duties. 136 Similarly, a support supplier
"should have known" (and probably did know) that there was
a breach of fiduciary duties when
it received over $200,000 in
1 37
one year for very little work.
However unlikely, organized crime figures might temper
their greed if they realized this might increase both the possibility that they would escape notice, and the difficulty in proving constructive knowledge. The plan administrator in the
example above might lower its cut to ten percent, or the support supplier might be content with $20,000. At first glance,
this makes it harder to say that organized crime figures
"should have known" of the breach. But these numbers
should not be judged in a vacuum. Not only should courts
consider the fee, but also the amount of services provided.
These fees may still be too high once the level of services, if
any, is factored in. When a support provider is doing next to
nothing, it is no more entitled to $20,000 than $200,000.
While corrupt non-fiduciaries could falsify their records in
an attempt to justify their high fees, this does not occur as
often as one would expect. Some support suppliers maintain
that their fees are simply "retainers."' 138 A service provider
could falsify its records to show that union members made
above-average use of its services in a particular period, thereby
justifying its high per capita rate. 39 However, the service provider's records could be verified by contacting individual patients about the actual treatment they received.
Depending on the type of service provided, when support
suppliers exaggerate what they did for a plan administrator or
service provider, there may not be any union members with
whom to cross-check the records. But it still should be possible to establish the actual level of services provided by contacting other individuals or corporations with whom the
support suppliers did business. If the support supplier says
136. See, e.g., HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 112.
137. See, eg., id. at 113.
138. See, eg., HEREIUHearings,98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 10 (1983) (statement of Dennis Cook).
139. See HEREIU Hearings,98th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 170 (1983) (statement
of Paul Jackson).
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that it provided secretarial services, plaintiffs can contact the
secretaries who supposedly worked, and the companies that
supposedly provided things like paper and typewriters.
It is more difficult when support suppliers claim to have
provided something amorphous like marketing assistance or
consulting services. The recipients of these services should be
required to demonstrate why these services were needed and
how the advice supposedly rendered was utilized. The supplier of these "services" should be required to produce records
which document when its "services" were provided and what
advice was given. It should not be enough that there were a
few telephone conversations or informal meetings.
In the face of substantial evidence that they made large
profits from PBPs for doing very little, some non-fiduciaries
may argue that they are simply honest business people without fiduciary obligations, and therefore, should not be held accountable if their services are over-priced relative to the
competition. 140 The argument is appealing since legitimate
non-fiduciaries are entitled to maximize their profits. But it is
fatally flawed when these companies do not honestly compete
for PBP contracts, and are organized solely to siphon off plan
assets. Plaintiffs should be able to establish either that no potential competitors were contacted to submit bids or that
those that submitted superior bids were inexplicably rejected.
This is just a sampling of the issues that courts will face in
actions brought to halt the abuse of PBPs. Other issues discussed in Sections II and III will also arise. For example, it
140. Consider the following hypothetical situation used by a support supplier in the
only case that deals with PBP abuse:
Local Labor Union has a health and welfare plan on behalf of its members.
Local's [trust] administrator . . . selects bids for dental services on behalf of
local's employees. After examination of all relevant factors, plan trustees [select]
Dental, Inc., which then proceeds to contract with Computer, Inc. and Secreta-

rial, Inc. to provide administrative and other services to Dental, Inc.
Computer, Inc. and Secretarial, Inc. will only provide their services to Dental, Inc. at a set fee which may be higher than similar services offered by other
companies. Do Computer, Inc. and Secretarial, Inc. have a duty to lower their
fee to Dental, Inc.?

. .

. If Dental, Inc. had a duty ...

to secure the services of

Cheap-Computer, Inc. and Cheaper, Inc. and Cheaper-Secretarial, Inc.... have
Computer, Inc. and Secretarial, Inc. incurred liability under ERISA by reason of
their fees charged to and paid by Dental, Inc.?
Defendant's Notice of Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, Gerace, No. 85-3669 (D.N.J. filed July
25, 1985).
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will be difficult to argue that service providers or support suppliers participate in breaches of trust in the sense that they
help cause them to occur. They usually will not have any
dealings with fiduciaries, and may only become involved after
the trustees and the trust administrator abdicate their fiduciary responsibilities. While it might be relatively easy to establish that they are "recipients with knowledge," it may be
increasingly difficult to prove that entities that funnel plan assets, or the organized crime figures that eventually receive
them, are as well. In addition, there may be problems imputing knowledge to corporations. There may be withdrawal and
late joiner issues for courts partial to applying the conspiracy
doctrine. There is the possibility that a court will hold a nonfiduciary jointly and severally liable for schemes in which he
did not participate if his associates were involved in more than
one PBP.
Despite these problems, courts should be able to see
through the maze of corporations, contracts and arguments to
determine how non-fiduciaries profited from breaches of trust,
and the "knowing participation" rationale provides an easily
understood construct in which to hold them liable under ERISA. In difficult cases, it may boil down to a question of "how
bad the fish smell."1 41 While this may be an inelegant way for
courts to proceed, ERISA's legislative history makes clear
that Congress intended courts to err on the side of benefit plan
participants and their beneficiaries, not non-fiduciaries.
V.

SUGGESTED CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

When ERISA cases are brought, courts should be able to
remedy breaches of trust by the continued use of the broad
powers granted to them by Congress. But the cases are few in
number and take years to be resolved. It took seven years for
the district court in Schmoutey to issue its opinion. The Secretary filed his complaint in Thornton in 1979, and that case is
now back in the district court. These delays are understandable when one recognizes the complexity of schemes to bilk
benefit plans and the financial and legal skills of those who
perpetrate them. For the same reasons, it is very difficult to
141. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (D.D.C. 1971).
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even identify these schemes, an even more troublesome concern that probably accounts for the small number of cases discussing non-fiduciary liability. Congress should act, therefore,
to reduce the possibility that breaches of trust will occur and
to make them easier to spot when they do. The suggestions
below range from the obvious to the extreme, and would raise
the administrative costs of benefit plans. But if benefit plans
are to be adequately protected, they are costs worth bearing.
A.

Increased Resources, Education and Coordination

In an era of record-breaking deficits, increased investigative and enforcement resources might be hard to find. But if
the President and Congress understand that benefit plans
probably represent the largest sum of money in the country
outside of the United States Treasury, 42 they might be inclined to step up vigilance in this area. If just one percent of
the approximately $1 trillion in benefit plans is being skimmed
off, that amounts to a loss of $10 billion. Even in a nation of
our great size, that represents a significant amount of foregone
wages, investment, and research and development. 143
If no one is capable of identifying, let alone unraveling
these schemes, however, any increase in resources will go to
waste. Since many branches of the federal government have
jurisdiction over benefit plans,"14 an interagency task force
should be formed to coordinate investigative and enforcement
strategies, and to hold training sessions for government officials who deal with benefit plans.'45 In order to supplement
the government's investigations, efforts should also be made to
142. See Select Comm. Hearings,supra note 39, at 3 (statement of Rep. Matthew
Rinaldo).
143. See Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 39, at 2 (statement of Chairman
Claude Pepper).

144. The Departments of Justice, Labor and the Treasury have jurisdiction over
benefit plans, and investigations have been held by Senate and House Committees, and
the General Accounting Office. The Department of Labor is responsible for enforcing
ERISA's fiduciary provisions. See Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713,
47,714 (1978). Unfortunately, "there is abundant evidence that the Department of Labor has been grossly derelict in its responsibility to enforce this and other provisions of
ERISA." Select Comm. Hearings,supra note 39, at 2 (statement of Chairman Claude
Pepper).
145. Since states generally license and monitor unions and have documentation of
benefit plan activities not readily accessible to federal investigators, state officials should
be invited to these training sessions. See HEREIUHearings,97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
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educate participants and beneficiaries about fiduciary duties
and the possible avenues of abuse. Their ability to identify the
most intricate schemes should not be underestimated. Moreover, some may know of the schemes, but do not know who to
tell, or are afraid to come forward with information.
Management is another resource that has largely gone untapped. In most cases, employers lose interest in benefit plans
once collective bargaining agreements are signed and costs become fixed.1 46 Employers should recognize that this hands-off
policy is costing them money. If benefit plans were properly
managed, they would be less expensive to maintain, and as
discussed above, more money would be available for other,
more productive uses.
B.

Expand the List of Prohibited Transactions
The list of prohibited transactions currently contained in
ERISA 47 should also include any transaction between a benefit plan and a non-fiduciary that involves a significant percentage of the plan's current asset value. Prohibiting these
transactions will help insure that honest fiduciaries do not risk
the financial safety of a plan by placing large amounts of plan
assets in the hands of unscrupulous non-fiduciaries. When fiduciaries are dishonest, the percentage limitation will act as a
deterrent since large transactions should attract the attention
of government authorities, participants, employers and others
who are aware of the percentage limitation. To insure that
good investment opportunities are not passed up, however, the
Secretary should establish an expedited exemption procedure
1 48
similar to that currently in place.
What amount is "significant?" Benefit plans are now required to include in their annual reports a description of their
"reportable transactions," which are transactions involving
more than three percent of the plan's current asset value.1 49
There is, however, a difference between reporting and prohibiting a transaction. A complete loss of three percent, while
at 49-58 (1982) (statement of Lt. Col. Justin Dintino, Executive Officer, New Jersey
State Police).
146. See HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 104-05.
147. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106 (West 1985). See supra note 36.
148. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108 (1982).
149. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1023(b) (3) (H) (West 1985).
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something to be avoided, would probably not beget extensive
financial problems. However, caution should be the guide
when dealing with these plans; therefore, the percentage figure
should probably lie between three and ten percent. The Secretary should insure that non-fiduciaries do not circumvent this
rule by breaking up transactions that exceed the limit into
smaller ones that do not.
C. More FrequentReporting
ERISA requires a benefit plan to file an annual report with
the Secretary that includes, among other things, an independent and qualified public accountant's financial analysis of the
plan.1 50 While the information contained in these reports is
useful in spotting breaches of trust, the reports are issued too
infrequently. Benefit plans should be required to issue reports
with the same frequency as public corporations regulated by
the securities laws, which file annual reports, quarterly reports, and special reports whenever there is any material
change in their financial positions. 1 5 1 One justification for this
frequent disclosure is that persons who might purchase the
securities of these corporations need accurate and current information in order to make an intelligent investment decision. 152 Protecting benefit plan participants and beneficiaries
provides an equally, if not more compelling justification for
increasing the frequency of plan reports. Independent accountants, actuaries, participants and beneficiaries, employers
and a host of government officials will necessarily have more
timely opportunities to spot evidence of malfeasance.
D. More Extensive Disclosure
In addition to more frequent reporting, there should be an
increase in the information contained in the reports. ERISA's
disclosure provisions currently "omit significant information
[about benefit plan] vendors and subcontractors."'15 3 These
150. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1023(a) (3) (A) (West 1985). A pension plan must also include
an actuary's report containing its opinion on the plan's ability to satisfy its long-term
obligations. Id.
151. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a, 240.15d (1985).
152. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982).
153. HEREIU REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
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omissions are especially glaring in the area of PBPs, where the
Secretary may only know the names of administrators and
service providers until investigations are commenced. Benefit
plans should be required, at a minimum, to disclose the compensation arrangements of these parties. Since most support
suppliers will be legitimate, even in corrupt PBPs, it may be
too much to ask that plans disclose how every support supplier is paid. The problem, however, is that any support supplier could be a conduit to organized crime. Benefit plans
should be required, therefore, to report the compensation arrangements for support suppliers whenever it amounts to
three percent or more of the plan's current asset value.
The Secretary should keep accurate records of PBP payment arrangements, and other financial data currently disclosed.154 When the sample sizes are large enough, the
Secretary will be able to determine, for example, the average
payment arrangements for PBPs, the average salaries for
trustees, and the average security received in a lending transaction, thus making it easier to determine which benefit plans
should be subject to closer scrutiny.
E. Licensing
While non-fiduciaries have been the focus of the article,
their ability to steal from benefit plans is largely dependent on
fiduciaries who breach their positions of trust. The Secretary
should be required to license fiduciaries before they can work
for benefit plans. Given that most states require barbers and
grocers to be licensed, this suggestion should not be considered too extreme. Non-fiduciaries such as plan administrators
and service providers, and outside the context of PBPs, nonfiduciaries that engage in plan-related work that exceeds three
percent of a plan's current asset value, should be licensed as
well. Applicants for these licenses should be required to describe their financial backgrounds, their experience with trust
work, the services they expect to provide, the remuneration
they expect to receive, the method by which they were selected, and state whether they have ever been convicted of, or
faced civil liability for, anything relating to benefit plans, trust
154. As of 1984, information disclosed by the plans to the Department of Labor
had not been "uniformly reviewed [or] catalogued." Id.
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work, or unions. The Secretary should be required to follow
objective standards in considering license applications, and
provisions should be made to insure that processing is expedited and there are adequate appeals and exemption
procedures. 155
Some might consider these suggestions unduly paternalistic. However, if the private and voluntary benefit plan system
now in place is not protected from corrupt and incompetent
individuals, the workers of this country may have to turn to a
government-run benefit plan system, a result far more radical
than what is advocated above.

155. Since non-fiduciaries are not required to exhibit the same level of prudence as
fiduciaries, the Secretary should impose less restrictive standards on non-fiduciaries
than on fiduciaries.

